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BIFURCATION IN INSANITY TRIALS: A CHANGE IN
MARYLAND'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The practice of bifurcating criminal trials into separate hearings
on the questions of guilt and insanity invariably elicits considerable
controversy. Advocates of bifurcation maintain that this procedure
diminishes prejudice to defendants and confusion to the trier of fact
inherent in combining an insanity defense with a not guilty plea.'
Opponents of bifurcation question whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, defendants may adduce evidence of their mental condi-
tion in the course of the hearings on guilt.' To date, no court has
found that there is a constitutional right to bifurcation,3 and courts
I. See, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (recogniz-
ing that substantial prejudice may result from simultaneous trial of not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity pleas); see also Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials: A
Double-Edged Sword, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 327, 329-31 (197 1). Another justification fre-
quently advanced for bifurcation is that it protects defendants asserting an insanity de-
fense from the disclosure during psychiatric testimony of inculpatory statements made
during compulsory mental examination, thereby eliminating the possibility of self-
incrimination. See United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872, 880-81 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Lewis v. Thulemeyer, 189 Colo. 139, 141-42, 538 P.2d 441, 443 (1975); State v. Jenkins,
412 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Iowa 1987): State v. Spurgin, 358 N.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Minn.
1984); State v. Devine, 372 N.W.2d 132, 137 (S.D. 1985); State ex rel. Follette v. Raskin,
34 Wis. 2d 607, 626-27, 150 N.W.2d 318. 328-29 (1967); cf. State ex rel. Johnson v. Dale,
277 Or. 359, 367, 560 P.2d 650, 654 (1977) (holding that ordering bifurcated trial for
purpose of avoiding perceived danger of self-incrimination is abuse of discretion).
2. See Comment, supra note I, at 328-29; see infra notes 72-86 and accompanying
text.
3. See Penneywell v. Rushen, 705 F.2d 355, 358 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that failure
to grant separate trial on insanity plea did not render trial "arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair"); Murphy v. Florida, 495 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding due process
does not require a separate trial on question of insanity), aff'd, 421 U.S. 794 (1975)
Simpson v. State, 275 A.2d 794, 795 (Del. 1971) (stating that "no decision has been
called to our attention holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to a bifurcated
trial"); People v. Newberry, 53 Ill. 2d 228, 236, 290 N.E.2d 592, 597 (1972) (holding no
constitutional right to bifurcated trial); Hester v. State, 262 Ind. 284, 286, 315 N.E.2d
351, 352 (1974) (stating that it was "aware of no case holding that there is a constitu-
tional right to a bifurcated trial"); State v. Levier, 226 Kan. 461, 464, 601 P.2d 1116,
1119 (1979) (holding refusal of bifurcated trial not violation of fifth amendment); Com-
monwealth v. Bumpus, 362 Mass. 672, 681, 290 N.E.2d 167, 175 (1972) (holding no
constitutional right to bifurcation on issues of participation in allegedly criminal conduct
and mental responsibility); State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 780, 606 P.2d 183, 190 (1980)
(holding that due process does not require bifurcation); People v. Yukl, 83 Misc. 2d 364,
366, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (stating that "no court has yet accepted
the argument that the concept of a bifurcated trial is a constitutional right that inures to
the defendant in any given case"); State v. Rogers, 17 Ohio St. 3d 174, 177, 478 N.E.2d
984, 988-89 (1985) (holding "due process does not require a separate trial on the issue
of insanity");. State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 818, 820 (R.I. 1986) (stating that constitution
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in three states have held statutes mandating bifurcation unconstitu-
tional on due process grounds.4 Nevertheless, the majority ofjuris-
dictions that have wrestled with the bifurcation issue have held in its
favor.5
does not require a bifurcated trial); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568 (1967)
(observing that "[t]wo-part jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence... [and] have never
been compelled by this Court as a matter of constitutional law . . .").
4. These three courts held that mandatory bifurcation statutes which restricted evi-
dence of the defendant's mental state to the insanity phase create an impermissible pre-
sumption of intent during the guilt phase and deny the defendant the right to introduce
evidence probative of his or her innocence, thus violating due process. Sie State v.
Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 113, 471 P.2d 715, 725 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971);
State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789, 794 (Fla. 1978); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d
270, 274 (Wyo. 1977). In addition, Texas's bifurcation statute was repealed by the state
legislature on due process grounds. See Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 61-62 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1968). See also infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
5. There are currently six jurisdictions that provide for bifurcation by statute or
court rule. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-8-104 (1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 40 (1983 & Supp. 1988); MINN. R.
CRIM. P. § 20.02, subd. 6 (West Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7404(c) (Purdon
1969 & Supp. 1988); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.165 (West Supp. 1988). Additionally, nu-
merous jurisdictions allow bifurcation, albeit reluctantly in some cases, in the sound
discretion of the trial court judge. See, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281, 282
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding bifurcation permissible when substantial insanity defense may
have a prejudicial effect on other defenses); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 788 (Alaska
1979) (holding bifurcation permissible when substantial insanity defense and a substan-
tial defense on merits); Garrett v. State, 320 A.2d 745, 748 (Del. 1974) (holding bifurca-
tion is required upon demonstration that insanity defense may prejudice defense on
merits); Hester, 262 Ind. at 288, 315 N.E.2d at 353 ("compelling circumstances" giving
rise to probable and substantial prejudice); State v. Jenkins, 412 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Iowa
1987) (discretion of trial court); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 387 N.E.2d 190, 194
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (sound discretion of trial court); People v. Donaldson, 65 Mich.
App. 588, 590, 237 N.W.2d 570, 571 (1975) (showing of substantial defense of insanity
and meritorious defense on merits); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 116, 124-25, 384
A.2d 124, 129 (1978) (appropriate whenever not guilty plea is coupled with insanity
defense); State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 83, 417 A.2d 585, 592 (1985) (holding when
defendant's counsel pursues insanity defense on defendant's behalf, presenting defenses
of self-defense and insanity in single trial could result in fundamentally unfair situation
for defendant); State v. Helms, 284 N.C. 508, 513, 201 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1974) (holding
that when there is a substantial defense on merits and an insanity defense exists, bifurca-
tion is within sound discretion of trial judge); State v. Lohnes, 432 N.W.2d 77, 86 (S.D.
1988) (stating bifurcation may be useful to guard against prejudice to insanity defense
and defense on merits); State v. Hohman, 138 Vt. 502, 513, 420 A.2d 852, 859 (1980)
(allowing bifurcation only under extraordinary circumstances); State v. Jones, 32 Wash.
App. 359, 369, 647 P.2d 1039, 1045 (1982) (finding bifurcation permissible if no signifi-
cant overlap between evidence relevant to insanity and self-defense pleas); State v.
Boyd, 280 S.E.2d 669, 675 (W. Va. 1981) (holding bifurcation permissible if having both
defense on merits and insanity defense presented at a unitary trial would create likeli-
hood of prejudice).
In a few states, courts have opined that separate trials on the issues of guilt and
insanity should be avoided in the interest ofjudicial economy. See, e.g., State v. Haseen,
191 N.J. Super. 564,565, 468 A.2d 448, 449 (1983) (stating that "a single trial is prefer-
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The Maryland Court of Appeals recently joined the majority
ranks when it approved bifurcation in Treece v. State.6 In large part,
this approval stemmed from the major statutory revisions on crimi-
nal responsibility adopted in 1984 that shifted the burden of proof
on the insanity issue to the defendant, thereby making a bifurcated
proceeding desirable in appropriate circumstances.' Recognizing
the need for uniform statewide standards to regulate the bifurcation
process, the Court of Appeals referred the responsibility of develop-
ing these standards to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Standing Committee).8
This comment first will examine the court's decision in Treece to
realign the State's criminal procedures with the recent changes in
Maryland law on criminal responsibility. Next, it will analyze the
new bifurcation rule as proposed by the Standing Committee and
adopted by the Court of Appeals. 9 In so doing, it will explore the
options for bifurcation as evidenced by statutory and case law from
other jurisdictions. Finally, it will conclude that the proposed statu-
tory bifurcation procedure, with minor changes, unquestionably will
provide criminal defendants asserting an insanity defense with a less
prejudicial alternative.
able because it preserves judicial resources"); State ex rel.Johnson, 277 Or. at 366, 560
P.2d at 654 (holding that "bifurcated trials should be avoided unless adequate reasons
therefor"); Smith, 512 A.2d at 822 (stating joint trial is preferable because "it conserves
judicial resources" and avoids "inherent unfairness" of giving accused two chances at
acquittal).
Other jurisdictions, citing a lack of statutory authority, have dismissed motions for
bifurcation cursorily without even considering the prejudicial nature of an insanity de-
fense. See Gruzen v. State, 276 Ark. 149, 153-54, 634 S.W.2d 92, 95 (1982) (holding
defendant "not entitled to a bifurcated trial . . .because our Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure do not provide for such a trial"); Edison v. State, 256 Ga. 67, 69, 344 S.E.2d 231,
233 (1986) (stating bifurcation not mandated under statute); State v. Sanders, 223 Kan.
273, 281, 574 P.2d 559, 565 (1977) (reasoning that bifurcation is not permissible be-
cause "the verdict form . . . contemplates an unbifurcated trial"); State v. Gray, 351 So.
2d 448, 455 (La. 1977) (holding no bifurcation when statute provides that "the defenses
available under combined plea of'not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity' shall be
tried together"); McKenzie v. Osborne, 195 Mont. 26, 36, 640 P.2d 368, 374 (1981)
(holding bifurcation statute contemplates the issues of guilt and insanity to be decided
in single trial); cf. Luna, 93 N.M. at 779-80, 606 P.2d at 189-90 (agreeing that there may
be circumstances where bifurcated trial might be preferable to ordinary trial but holding
that statute for single trial procedure is to be followed until rules are amended to accom-
modate for such change).
6. 313 Md. 665, 547 A.2d 1054 (1988).
7. Id. at 686-87, 547 A.2d at 1065. See infra text accompanying notes 23-28.
8. Treece, 313 Md. at 687, 547 A.2d at 1065.
9. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (codified at MD. R. 4-314). Marylafid Rule 4-314 shall apply to
all actions commenced on or after July 1, 1989. Id.
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I. THE TREECE DECISION
James William Treece was indicted for rape in December
1985." ° His appointed public defender entered pleas of "not
guilty" and "not responsible for criminal conduct" on his behalf,
coupled with a request that Treece be evaluated to determine
whether he was competent to stand trial." A thorough psychiatric
examination established Treece's competence to comprehend the
charges against him and to assist in his own defense.'"
At the start of the trial Treece asserted that he disagreed with
his attorney's decision to plead not criminally responsible.'" Never-
theless, over Treece's objections, the trial court permitted his attor-
ney to present evidence that Treece was paranoid and subject to
delusions and, therefore, was not criminally responsible at the time
of the alleged rape.' 4 In his own defense, Treece testified that the
sexual intercourse had been consensual.' 5 After lengthy delibera-
tions the jury rejected the insanity defense and found Treece guilty
of second degree rape.' 6
Treece filed a pro se motion for a new trial, contending that the
not criminally responsible plea had hopelessly prejudiced his case.' 7
The trial court and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found
that despite the objections of a client, the decision to enter a plea of
not criminally responsible by reason of insanity is a tactical trial de-
cision for the defense attorney to make.' 8 The Maryland Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the ultimate decision as to what plea
to enter lies with the defendant, as long as the defendant is compe-
tent to stand trial.'" The court reasoned that while it was reason-
10. Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 668, 547 A.2d 1054, 1055 (1988).
I1. Id., 547 A.2d at 1055-56.
12. Id., 547 A.2d at 1056.
13. Id. at 668-69, 547 A.2d at 1056.
14. Id. at 669-70, 547 A.2d at 1056. Under Maryland law, a defendant found guilty
of the offense charged subsequently may be found not criminally responsible for his or
her conduct if the defendant is found to be insane at the time of the offense. See MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-108(a), 12-109(c) (Supp. 1988); see also infra notes 38-40
and accompanying text.
15. Treece, 313 Md. at 669-70, 547 A.2d at 1056. Consent of the victim is a defense in
a criminal prosecution only when it negates an element of the offense charged. Because
rape "typically is defined as the 'unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her con-
sent,' " consent by a woman to sexual intercourse negates an element of the crime of
rape. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.11(a) (2d ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
16. Treece, 313 Md. at 670, 547 A.2d at 1056.
17. Id., 547 A.2d at 1057.
18. Id. at 667, 547 A.2d at 1055.
19. Id. at 681, 547 A.2d at 1062. In arriving at'this decision, the court cited Brook-
hart v.Janis, 384 U.S. I (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that the constitutional
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able for Treece's attorney to file a plea of not criminally responsible
on his behalf, Treece's competence entitled him to make an intelli-
gent and voluntary decision to withdraw the plea.20
Next, the Court of Appeals examined a question of greater sig-
nificance for the purposes of this comment: was the defense entitled
to open and close argument on the issue of criminal responsibil-
ity?2 In addressing this question the court reviewed the major stat-
utory revisions on criminal responsibility adopted by the Maryland
General Assembly in 1984.22
Prior to the adoption of these statutory revisions, the State had
the burden of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. 23  Section 12-109(b) of the Health-General Article now
places on the defendant "the burden to establish, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the defense of not criminally responsible. ' 24
Additionally, upon a finding of guilty but insane, the prior law pro-
right of a defendant to plead not guilty cannot be waived by the defendant's counsel. d.
at 7. The Court of Appeals also noted Justice White's assertion in North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), that a plea should not be forced on a defendant, who "must
be permitted to judge for himself" which of the various alternative pleas should be
made. id. at 33.
20. Treece, 313 Md. at 683, 547 A.2d at 1063. Although the Court of Appeals agreed
that defense counsel makes the final determinations as to the strategic and tactical deci-
sions connected with a criminal trial, the court advanced a number of reasons for hold-
ing that a competent defendant is entitled to decide personally whether to invoke the
insanity defense. First, the court noted that a defendant who "successfully" asserts a not
criminally responsible plea faces both the stigma of a criminal conviction and indefinite
commitment to a state institution. Id. at 677, 547 A.2d at 1060. See Mo. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 12-111 (a), 12-113(d) (Supp. 1988). The court also recognized that if a
charged offense carries a low maximum penalty, the defendant may wish to risk imposi-
tion of the penalty rather than chance indefinite commitment. Treece, 313 Md. at 677,
547 A.2d at 1060. Finally, the court asserted that the stigma frequently attached to in-
sanity and the potential conflict between an insanity defense and a defense on the merits
may dissuade a defendant from filing an insanity plea. Id. at 677-78, 547 A.2d at 1060.
See also infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
21. Treece, 313 Md. at 683-84, 547 A.2d at 1063.
22. Id. at 686-87, 547 A.2d at 1064-65. In 1984 the Governor's Task Force to Re-
view the Defense of Insanity recommended a number of substantial changes in the in-
sanity defense which were adopted by chapter 501 of the Acts of 1984. See Act of May
29, 1984, ch. 501, 1984 Md. Laws 2657. These changes are contained in the present
provisions of title 12 of the Health-General Article. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-101 to -121 (Supp. 1988). See Anderson v. Department of Health & Mental Hy-
giene, 310 Md. 217, 220-22, 528 A.2d 904, 906-07 (1987).
23. Treece, 313 Md. at 686, 547 A.2d at 1064; ,4nderson, 310 Md. at 220, 528 A.2d at
906.
24. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109(b) (Supp. 1988). In Hoey v. State, 311
Md. 473, 536 A.2d 622 (1988), the Court of Appeals held that it is constitutionally per-
missible to place the burden of proof on the defendant to prove a lack of criminal re-
sponsibility as long as the State retains the burden of proof on all elements of the crime,
including mens rea. Id. at 490-91, 536 A.2d at 630. See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
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vided for an evaluation period during an initial confinement which
extended only for a limited time.2 5 The State had the burden of
establishing the prerequisites for indefinite commitment by clear
and convincing evidence. The State also carried this burden when
an indefinitely committed defendant sought release from the institu-
tion.21 Section 12-111 (a) of the Health-General Article now autho-
rizes indefinite commitment automatically upon finding a convicted
defendant not criminally responsible. 27 Further, defendants seeking
institutional release must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he or she is entitled to release. 28 Taken together, these statu-
tory provisions provide the backdrop for the Treece decision.
The general rule in Maryland is that "the party holding the af-
firmative of the issue.., has the right to begin and reply, both in the
introduction of evidence and in the argument to the jury. 12 9 Ac-
cording to the Treece court, this rule suggests that the defense should
be permitted to open and close argument on the issue of criminal
responsibility because it is the defense which now bears the burden
of proof on that issue. 30 As a matter of practice, however, allowing
the prosecutor to argue first and last on the question of guilt and the
defense counsel to argue first and last on the question of criminal
responsibility in the same proceeding inevitably would produce
overlap and confusion.3 '
Moreover, both the nature and the consequences of an insanity
defense are altogether unlike that of any other affirmative defense.
As the Treece court noted, a defense of not criminally responsible
seriously could prejudice a defense on the merits.3 2 For example,
790, 798-99 (1952) (upholding Oregon statute which imposed burden of persuasion on
the defendant to prove his or her sanity beyond reasonable doubt).
25. Anderson, 310 Md. at 221, 528 A.2d at 906. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 12-110(a) (1982) (repealed 1984).
26. Treece, 313 Md. at 686, 547 A.2d at 1065; Anderson, 310 Md. at 221, 528 A.2d at
906; see also MD. HEALTH-CEN. CODE ANN. § 12-113(b) (1982) (repealed 1984).
27. MD. HEALTI-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-111 (a) (Supp. 1988).
28. Id. § 12-118(c)(4)(i).
29. Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 255, 539 A.2d 637, 652 (1988) (citation omitted).
30. 313 Md. at 684-85, 547 A.2d at 1064.
31. Id. at 685, 547 A.2d at 1064.
32. Id. at 677-78, 547 A.2d at 1060. Commentators opine that evidence of insanity
"involves a presentation of the defendant's entire life history, social environment, and
emotional and psychological experiences with special emphasis on his past anti-social
and criminal behavior . . . tend[ing] to be fatally prejudicial to all other defenses based
upon a different and contradictory view of the defendant." Comment, supra note I, at
329-30 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that
substantial prejudice may result from the simultaneous trial on the pleas of
1050 [VOL. 48:1045
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Treece testified that the sexual intercourse was consensual, while his
attorney presented a defense based on paranoia and delusions at the
time of the alleged rape."3 Although intended to depict Treece's
mental state at the time of the alleged rape, the evidence introduced
may have thwarted substantially the credibility of his consent de-
fense in the eyes of the jury. 4 Yet the same jury might conclude
that Treece's impaired mental condition did not constitute legal in-
sanity.3 5 Furthermore, while the effective assertion of an ordinary
affirmative defense typically results in acquittal, grave consequences
flow from a "successful" insanity defense.3 6
The combination of these factors led the Court of Appeals to
conclude that "at least under some circumstances, it would be better
practice to bifurcate a trial in which criminal responsibility is an is-
sue, with the decision on guilt or innocence to be made first, and
then, if the verdict is guilty, the decision on criminal responsibility is
made."' 37 The decision to harmonize Maryland's criminal proce-
dures with its revised statutory provisions on criminal responsibility
by bifurcating the questions of guilt and criminal responsibility is
sound. Under Maryland law, criminal responsibility is not even an
insanity and not guilty. The former requires testimony that the crime charged
was the product of the accused's mental illness. Ordinarily, this testimony will
tend to make the jury believe that he did the act. Also, evidence of past anti-
social behavior and present anti-social propensities, which tend to support a
defense of insanity, is highly prejudicial with respect to other defenses. More-
over, evidence that the defendant has a dangerous mental illness invites the
jury to resolve doubts concerning commission of the act by finding him not
guilty by reason of insanity, instead of acquitting him, so as to assure his con-
finement in a mental hospital.
Id. at 282 (citations omitted). See also Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 788 (Alaska 1979)
(holding that denial of motion for bifurcated trial substantially prejudiced defendant in
presenting self-defense theory in view of defense psychiatrist's testimony that he did not
believe self-defense claim).
33. Treece, 313 Md. at 678, 547 A.2d at 1060.
34. Id. Additionally, coupling an insanity plea with another defense may appear in-
consistent or confusing to the jury because the insanity defense traditionally has been
viewed as an admission of guilt and an attempt to evade criminal punishment. See
Holmes, 363 F.2d at 282; Louisell & Hazard, Isanily as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 805, 806 n.2 (1961).
35. Treece, 313 Md. at 678, 547 A.2d at 1060.
36. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 15, at § 4.5(a); see also supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text.
37. Treece, 313 Md. at 685, 547 A.2d at 1064. The Court of Appeals and the Court of
Special Appeals previously have held that bifurcation is not necessary when the issue of
criminal responsibility is raised. See Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 601, 188 A.2d 150, 153
(1963); Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 315, 307 A.2d 503, 519, cert. denied, 269 Md.
755, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974). In Treece the Court of Appeals distinguished these
cases by noting that they antedate the major revisions in the law on criminal responsibil-
ity. 313 Md. at 686, 547 A.2d at 1064.
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issue until a guilty verdict has been returned.3 8 As recently ex-
pounded by the Court of Appeals in Hoey v. State,3 9 the mens rea re-
quirements of a crime are quite distinct from the requirements
necessary to show a lack of criminal responsibility.4" Additionally,
while evidence of mens rea bears on culpability, evidence of criminal
responsibility or a lack thereof goes instead to the appropriateness
vel non of criminal punishment.4 '
Thus, while it is evident that severing the criminal responsibility
issue from the guilt phase of the trial is both warranted and feasible
under Maryland law, the question remains of precisely how the bi-
furcated proceeding should be structured and governed. Notably,
several subsidiary issues exist. Should bifurcation be mandatory or
discretionary? If discretionary, what threshold of evidence would
warrant bifurcation? Should psychiatric evidence or evidence of
mental state be admissible during the guilt phase of the trial to ne-
gate the intent element of the crime? Should there be separate ju-
ries for the guilt and insanity phases of trial? And finally, if a single
jury is to be impaneled, should it be informed during voir dire of the
not criminally responsible by reason of insanity plea? An examina-
tion of the procedure for bifurcation adopted by the Court of Ap-
peals reveals that the court carefully considered and provided
answers for all of these questions. While this list certainly is not
exhaustive, it raises most of the debated issues regarding bifurcation
and will comprise the focus of analysis of the new rule.
38. The Health-General Article provides in pertinent part that
if the trier of fact finds that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the criminal act charged, then if the defendant
has pleaded not criminally responsible, the trier of fact separately shall find, by
a preponderance of the evidence, whether the defendant was at the time crimi-
nally responsible or not criminally responsible by reason of insanity ....
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109(c) (Supp. 1988). Cf. Pouncey v. State, 297 Md.
264, 268, 465 A.2d 475, 477 (1983) (holding that a defendant can be found both guilty
and insane).
39. 311 Md. 473, 536 A.2d 622 (1988).
40. Id. at 492-93, 536 A.2d at 631. Alens rea, or "guilty mind," is the mental element
of most criminal offenses and often includes the requirement of intent to commit a
crime. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 15, at §§ 3.4, 3.5. By contrast, the standard to
establish a lack of criminal responsibility under Maryland law is: "A defendant is not
criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant,
because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity: (1) To
appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) To conform that conduct to the re-
quirements of law." MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-108(a) (Supp. 1988). The dis-
tinction between intent and insanity is important because bifurcation is premised on the
notion that guilt and insanity are separable. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying
text.
41. Hoey, 311 Md. at 494, 536 A.2d at 632.
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II. THE RULE ON BIFURCATION
In response to the Treece decision, the Standing Committee
drafted a new procedure to regulate the defense of not criminally
responsible by reason of insanity.4 2 Maryland Rule 4-314 is by far
the most detailed rule written on bifurcation and borrows substan-
tially from bifurcation statutes, rules, and case law of other states.43
This comment will concentrate on three major issues-the role of
discretion in a bifurcation procedure, the admissibility of psychiatric
evidence during the guilt phase, and the role of thejury-in light of
the statutes and case law of other jurisdictions that have considered
bifurcation. In addition a miscellany of other pertinent portions of
the new rule will be noted briefly.
A. The Role of Discretion
Maryland Rule 4-314(a)(1) gives the trial judge discretion to
utilize a two-staged trial proceeding (1) if the defendant pleads not
guilty and not criminally responsible by reason of insanity, and (2) if
the defendant requests a jury trial.14 Conversely, out of the six ju-
risdictions with statutes or court rules providing for bifurcation,
four states-California, Colorado, Minnesota, and Wisconsin-man-
date bifurcation when a defendant files simultaneous pleas of not
guilty and not criminally responsible.4 5 Only Minnesota, however,
has addressed specifically its rationale for compelling bifurcation.
In State v. Jackman46 the Supreme Court of Minnesota asserted that
"[m]andatory bifurcation promotes the policy goals of excluding
psychiatric testimony regarding intent.., and obviates objections to
admissibility at trial of self-incriminating statements made by de-
fendant in the compulsory mental examination." 47
42. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (codified at MD. R. 4-314).
43. Id.
44. Id. (codified at Md. R. 4-314(d)(1)).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989): COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-8-
104 (1986); MINN. R. CRtiM. P. § 20.02 (West Supp. 1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.165
(West Supp. 1988).
46. 396 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1986). InJackman the defendant, in an attempt to obtain
a unitary trial proceeding, filed a single plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness and
refused to plead as to the elements of the crime. Id. at 27. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that the trial court properly entered a plea of not guilty on the defend-
ant's behalf and that the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require a bifurcated
trial where the defendant does not admit the elements of the crime and also relies on the
defense of mental illness, regardless of whether the defendant affirmatively pleads both
issues. Id. at 29.
47. Id. at 28-29 (citing State v. Spurgin. 358 N.W.2d 648, 650-51 (Minn. .1984). and
State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 1982)).
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Although this may be true,48 the Treece court reasoned that a
bifurcation proceeding is intended to benefit the defendant and
"the defendant must bear the ultimate consequences of any decision
[regarding an insanity plea]."'49 Raising an insanity defense is essen-
tially a tactical trial decision; therefore, the defendant should be
given the option of presenting an insanity defense in a unitary trial if
it strategically would be advantageous to do so. 50 Making bifurca-
tion discretionary rather than mandatory also would promote judi-
cial economy by allowing the trial court to deny frivolous or
unsubstantiated motions.5" Overall, a discretionary bifurcation pro-
ceeding such as that prescribed in rule 4-314 clearly is preferable to
compulsory bifurcation.
Subsection (a)(1) of rule 4-3 14, however, does present one rela-
tively minor difficulty. The rule stipulates that either the defendant or
the State may move for a bifurcated trial when the defendant raises
the insanity defense. 2 Although the added time and expense make
it unlikely that the prosecutor would request a bifurcated trial,5 3 the
defendant should retain the exclusive option because the decision to
plead not criminally responsible is predominantly a matter of trial
strategy.
5 4
A crucial question in determining whether a court should exer-
cise discretion to bifurcate a criminal proceeding is exactly what
proffer of evidence warrants bifurcation. Maryland Rule 4-314(a)(3)
states that "the court shall grant a request for bifurcation unless the
court finds and states on the record a compelling reason to deny the
motion."55 This language, however, provides little practical gui-
dance for the trial court. A review of case law in those jurisdictions
48. Under the proposed rule, it appears that psychiatric evidence regarding intent
will be admissible during the guilt phase of the trial. See infra text accompanying notes
93-100.
49. 313 Md. 665, 679, 547 A.2d 1054, 1061 (1988) (quoting Frendak v. United
States, 408 A.2d 364, 378 (D.C. 1979)). See also supra note 20.
50. See Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 116, 125, 384 A.2d 124, 130 (1978) (observ-
ing that "[a] defendant may wish not to bifurcate but nonetheless to plead not guilty and
raise the insanity issue"). Maryland Rule 4-314 specifically prescribes a procedure for a
unitary trial with a limited separation of issues if the defendant refuses to request a
bifurcated trial or ifa request is made and denied. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (codified at MD. R.
4-314(c)).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 55-66.
52. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (codified at MD. R. 4-314(a)(1)).
53. But see Louisell & Hazard, supra note 34, at 807-09 (observing that bifurcation
historically was viewed as an aid to the prosecution).
54. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
55. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (codified at MD. R. 4-314(a)(3)). The trial court's decision
presumably will be subject to an "abuse of discretion" review. 16 Md. Reg. 62 1.
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that already allow bifurcation at the discretion of the trial court
reveals a fairly well-established test for determining the appropriate-
ness of bifurcation.5 6 The cases outlining and interpreting this test
will furnish direction to the Maryland courts faced with the ambigui-
ties of the new rule and, therefore, warrant careful scrutiny.
The prevailing test for determining whether to grant a bifur-
cated trial was established .by courts in' the District of Columbia,
which, by judicial decision, allow bifurcation at the discretion of the
trial court.57 The leading District of Columbia case on bifurcation,
Holmes v. United States,5a declared that "[r]elevant considerations
upon a request for bifurcation include the substantiality of [the de-
fendant's] insanity defense and its prejudicial effect on other de-
56. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
57. The District of Columbia has produced a considerable body of persuasive case
law on the bifurcation issue. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 510 F.2d 1283, 1289 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (finding it desirable for second jury to hear insanity defense if necessary to
eliminate prejudice); United States v. Bennett. 460 F.2d 872. 881 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stat-
ing trial court should determine in advance whether government psychiatrists intend to
disclose statements of accused which could prejudice defense on the merits on motion
to bifurcate); Contee v. United States, 410 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding bifur-
cation appropriate when there are both substantial defense on merits and substantial
insanity defense): Higgins v. United States, 401 F.2d 396, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding
defendant carries burden of demonstrating need for bifurcation); Parman v. United
States, 399 F.2d 559, 561-62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968) (finding that
trial court's denial of motion for bifurcation conditioned upon impaneling separate ju-
ries for guilt and insanity phases not an abuse of discretion); Harried v. United States,
389 F.2d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that trial judge has discretion but not duty
to consider bifurcation in absence of request from defense counsel, even when trial
court injects issue of insanity over defendant's objections); Holmes v. United States, 363
F.2d 281, 282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (finding that substantial prejudice may result from
simultaneous trial on pleas of insanity and not guilty); Lucas v. United States, 497 A.2d
1070, 1072-75 (D.C. 1985) (holding that impeachment of government evidence may
constitute "substantial defense on the merits" requisite for bifurcation); Kleinbart v.
United States, 426 A.2d 343, 353-55 (D.C. 1981) (finding that trial court abused its dis-
cretion in refusing bifurcated trial when there was substantial defense on the merits and
substantial insanity defense); Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911, 925-26 (D.C.
1979) (holding separate voir dire required for insanity phase); Harris v. United States,
377 A.2d 34, 39 (D.C. 1977) (stating trial court has broad discretion in considering im-
paneling of two juries); Shanahan v. United States, 354 A.2d 524, 527-28 (D.C. 1976)
(request for new jury at insanity phase is addressed to discretion of trial judge). Virtu-
ally every jurisdiction which allows bifurcation in the discretion of the trial court by
judicial decision closely follows the procedures for bifurcation established by District of
Columbia case law. See supra note 5.
58. 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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fenses." ' 59 Similarly, Contee v. United States 60 held that "a sound
exercise of the trial court's discretion ordinarily will result in bifur-
cation whenever a defendant shows that he has a substantial insanity
defense and a substantial defense on the merits to any element of
the charge, either of which would be prejudiced by simultaneous
presentation with the other."'"
Pennsylvania, the only other state which prescribes a discretion-
ary bifurcation procedure by statute,62 employs a similar standard
for deciding whether to separate the issue of criminal responsibility
from the issue of guilt. In ruling on a motion for bifurcation, the
Pennsylvania statute explicitly directs the trial court to consider "the
substantiality of the defense of lack of responsibility and its effect
upon other defenses. ' 63
In light of the case law in other jurisdictions, the Maryland
courts presumably will weigh both the substantiality of a defense on
the merits and the insanity defense and the likelihood of prejudice
to either if presented in a unitary trial when considering whether a
compelling reason exists to deny the motion for bifurcation. The
application of this test should be fairly straightforward in cases in
which the defendant intends to assert self-defense or a consent de-
fense (as in Treece) or another affirmative defense which is highly
susceptible to prejudice from an insanity plea. '
Additionally, separation of the issues will promote judicial
economy because repetition of evidence is avoided in the guilt and
insanity phases.6 5 In fact, judicial economy might even be fostered
59. Id. at 283. This appeal followed the district court's denial of Holmes's post-con-
viction motion to vacate his sentence for robbery and impersonating a police officer due
to ineffective assistance of counsel after his counsel failed to invoke the insanity defense
at trial because he was concerned with the threat of prejudice to Holmes's defense on
the merits. Id. at 282. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
that trial counsel's appraisal of the prejudicial effect of the insanity defense on the de-
fense of not guilty was reasonable and held that such prejudice may be remedied in the
future by a bifurcated trial procedure. The court, however, refused to grant Holmes the
retrospective application of this remedy. Id. at 283-84.
60. 410 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 250. The Contee court further opined that "in cases of doubt, the question
should be resolved in favor of bifurcation .... " Id.
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7404 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1988). In Maine a defend-
ant who files a not criminally responsible plea has the choice of electing either a bifur-
cated or unitary trial; the trial court, however, does not have the discretion to refuse to
bifurcate when a defendant opts for separate hearings on the issues of criminal responsi-
bility and guilt. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 40 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7404(c) (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1988). See Common-
wealth v. Murphy, 493 Pa. 35, 39, 425 A.2d 352, 354 (1981).
64. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
65. Contee v. United States, 410 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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further if the defendant is acquitted because an acquittal on the
merits will eliminate altogether the usually long and complex hear-
ing on the insanity issue. 66
Complications may arise, however, when a defendant presents a
defense predicated either upon disproving an element of the crime
charged or discrediting the government's case. For example, if the
defendant attempts to negate the mens rea or intent element of a
crime by presenting psychiatric evidence or evidence of an impaired
mental state, the introduction of psychiatric evidence in both stages
of the trial may result in repetition in the insanity portion.67 Such
cases will require the trial court to balance the desire to eliminate
the prejudice inherent in raising an insanity defense concurrently
with a defense on the merits with the necessity to promote judicial
economy." Alternatively, a defendant's case on the merits may con-
sist entirely of challenging the government's evidence, such as im-
peaching the credibility of a state's witness. It is unclear, however,
whether such a defense constitutes a "substantial defense on the
merits" or is sufficiently incompatible with an insanity defense to
justify a bifurcated trial.69 Maryland courts will be forced to scruti-
nize bifurcation motions more carefully under such circumstances,
and again will have to balance the possibility of prejudice with the
reality of the need for efficient judicial administration.
B. Admissibility of Psychiatric Evidence
The question of whether, and under what circumstances, a de-
66. Id.
67. See Louisell & Hazard, supra note 34, at 829-30.
68. See Contee, 410 F.2d at 250 (doubting whether bifurcation should be allowed if the
evidence on criminal responsibility significantly overlaps the evidence on the merits);
State v.Jones, 32 Wash. App. 359, 369, 647 P.2d 1039, 1045 (1982) (finding bifurcation
inappropriate where there was significant overlap of evidence relevant to both insanity
and not guilty pleas).
69. In Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911 (D.C. 1979), the court concluded that
the "defense's serious challenge to the government's circumstantial evidence"
presented a substantial defense on the merits, notwithstanding that the defense did not
proffer any evidence on the merits to the trial court at the time the court was considering
bifurcation. Id. at 925. See also Lucas v. United States, 497 A.2d 1070, 1075 (D.C. 1985)
(reaffirming that a proffer of defense evidence is not necessarily a prerequisite to bifur-
cation); cf. United States v. Ashe, 427 F.2d 626, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding failure to
bifurcate was abuse of discretion when government presented relatively weak evidence
on the merits). A number of jurisdictions, however, have held that maintaining a de-
fense based on a defendant's presumption of innocence or "putting the government to
its proof" does not warrant bifurcation. See, e.g., Garrett v. State, 320 A.2d 745, 748
(Del. 1974); State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 818, 821 (R.I. 1986); State v. Hohman, 138 Vt.
502, 513, 420 A.2d 852, 859 (1980); State v. Boyd, 280 S.E.2d 669, 676 (W. Va. 1981).
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fendant may introduce psychiatric or mental state evidence during
the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial highlights the focus of the con-
troversy over bifurcation. Commentators have observed, "To draw
a line between evidence of mental condition admissible at the first
trial, and that admissible only at the second trial, a line that is logi-
cally satisfactory and administratively feasible, is a herculean
task." 7
The fundamental problem in this area stems from the manner
in which the criminal law regards insanity. While every jurisdiction
recognizes the insanity defense, 7 two distinct schools of thought
have developed to explain the effect of the defense at trial. As will
be detailed below, the admissibility of psychiatric evidence during
the guilt phase of a trial largely depends upon the way in which the
relationship between insanity and crime is defined. The admissibil-
ity of psychiatric evidence under rule 4-314 also will hinge on where
Maryland falls within this dichotomy.
1. Insanity and Mental State.-The first school of thought posits
that a mentally diseased person is incapable of committing a crime.72
Stated another way, an insane person cannot formulate the intent
which is an essential element of guilt. 73 Because intent logically is
inseparable from guilt,74 any procedure which purports to separate
the issues of guilt and insanity would be unworkable.75
Jurisdictions endorsing this theory have found that bifurcation
is not feasible or at least is more difficult. 76 This is because psychiat-
ric or mental state evidence presumably will be relevant, and thus
should be admissible, with regard to both the intent element of the
70. Louisell & Hazard, supra note 34, at 820 (footnote omitted).
7 1. See Gallivan, Insanity, Bifurcation and Due Process: Can Values Survive Doctrine, 13
LAND & WATER L. REV. 515, 527 (1978); Louisell & Hazard, supra note 34, at 805.
72. See, e.g., Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244, 246 n.2 (Fla. 1977) (stating that "the
law does not hold a person criminally accountable for his conduct while insane, since an
insane person is no( capable of forming the intent essential to the commission of a
crime"); Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 277 (Wyo. 1977) (finding that insanity "would
preclude the elements of intent and thus require a finding of no criminal violation"); see
also Gallivan, supra note 71, at 520; Louisell & Hazard, supra note 34, at 805.
73. Wheeler, 344 So. 2d at 246 n.2; Sanchez, 567 P.2d at 277. It has been noted, how-
ever, that the insanity defense theoretically would be available in a prosecution for a
strict liability crime which requires no evidence of intent or mental state. W. LAFAVE &
A. Scotr, supra note 15, at § 4.1(a).
74. See Comment, supra note 1, at 328.
75. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 113, 471 P.2d 715, 725 (1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1009 (1971) (holding that bifurcated trials violate due process); State ex rel.
Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789, 794 (Fla. 1978) (same); Sanchez, 567 P.2d at 274 (same).
76. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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crime adjudicated in the guilt stage and the criminal responsibility
issue determined in the insanity stage of a bifurcated trial.77 Al-
lowing the introduction of psychiatric evidence in both stages not
only would undermine the purpose of bifurcation, which is to miti-
gate the possibility of prejudice by separating as much as possible
the issues of guilt and insanity, but would make the insanity stage
largely repetitive of the guilt stage .7  Restricting psychiatric evi-
dence to the insanity proceeding, however, creates an irrefutable
presumption of guilt violative of due process.79 Thus, courts in Ari-
zona, Florida, and Wyoming, which adhere to the notion that in-
sanity renders a person incapable of committing a crime, have held
their statutes mandating bifurcation unconstitutional.8 0
Curiously, two other states following this approach to in-
sanity-California and Colorado-have allowed psychiatric evidence
during the guilt stage for the limited purpose of showing diminished
77. See Shaw, 106 Ariz. at 109, 471 P.2d at 721; Green, 355 So. 2d at 792; Sanchez, 567
P.2d at 278.
78. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
79. Under this approach, the determination of sanity, an essential element of intent,
in isolation of the determination of guilt would deny the defendant the right to disprove
a material element of the crime prior to a determination of guilt. See Shaw, 106 Ariz. at
112. 471 P.2d at 724 ("To prohibit the introduction of any or all the evidence bearing
on proof of insanity at the trial of guilt or innocence would deprive a defendant of the
opportunity of rebutting intent, premeditation, and malice, because an insane person
could have none."); State ex rel. Boyd, 355 So. 2d at 793 ("Under the bifurcated system
established by our legislature, no evidence of insanity is admissible during that phase of
the trial on which guilt or innocence is determined. Sanity is, in effect, presumed, giving
rise to an irrebuttable presumption of the existence of the requisite intent ... in viola-
tion of due process."); Sanchez v. State 567 P.2d 270, 280 (Wyo. 1977) ("In meeting
[its] burden, the state was impermissibly aided by a presumption of intent which arose
before appellant had an opportunity to present his defense of insanity.").
80. Shaw v. State, 106 Ariz. 103, 113, 471 P.2d 715, 725 (1970) (striking down a
nonelective two trial statute); State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789, 792 (Fla. 1978)
(finding that "the bifurcated trial procedure established by the legislature for the adjudi-
cation of guilt and insanity denies a defendant his right to due process of law"); Sanchez,
567 P.2d at 278 (holding that bifurcation statute "fails to satisfy due-process require-
ments with respect to specific-intent crimes, such as . . . rape").
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responsibility. 8' In People v. Wetmore"2 the California Supreme Court
held that if evidence of a defendant's mental state indicates that the
defendant lacked the specific intent to commit the crime charged,
this evidence is admissible during the guilt stage notwithstanding
that it also may be probative of insanity.8" The admission of psychi-
atric evidence during the guilt stage to establish diminished respon-
sibility, however, has rendered California's bifurcation procedure so
inconsistent and cumbersome as to make it almost unworkable. 4
Colorado, which also allows evidence of an impaired mental condi-
tion during the guilt phase for specific intent crimes, 5 arguably cir-
cumvents this problem by trying the sanity issue first with the
burden of proof on the state, and then if the defendant is found to
be sane, trying the guilt issue before a different jury. 6
2. Insanity and Punishment.-The second viewpoint on the
nexus between insanity and crime maintains that mentally ill per-
sons are capable of forming the intent necessary to commit a crime
but should not be subjected to punishment for their illegal acts.87
81. Diminished responsibility refers to a lack of capacity "to achieve the state of
mind requisite for the commission of the crime." People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 35 1,
364, 406 P.2d 43, 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 772 (1965) (footnote omitted). The concept of
diminished responsibility, which has been adopted as an affirmative defense in a number
of jurisdictions, permits the trier of fact to consider the impaired mental state of the
defendant in mitigation of the punishment or the degree of the offense even though the
impairment does not qualify as insanity under the prevailing test. BLAcK's LAw DictiON-
ARY 412 (5th ed. 1979). In Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), the
Court of Appeals held that diminished responsibility is not a defense in Maryland. id. at
418, 439 A.2d at 550. The court reaffirmed this in Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 495 n.5,
536 A.2d 622, 632 n.5 (1988).
82. 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
83. Id. at 324, 583 P.2d at 1312, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 269. The court's decision in
ll'etmore rejected dictum to the contrary in People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 350, 202 P.2d
53, 65, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949). See I'etmore, 22 Cal. 3d at 321, 583 P.2d at 1310,
149 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
84. See also State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 112, 471 P.2d 715, 724 (1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1009 (1971) (noting the difficulties California has encountered in the adminis-
tration of its bifurcated trials). See generally Isaacs, The Gradual Decay of the Bifurcated Trial
System in California and the Emergence of "'Partial Insanity", 3 CAL. W.L. REV. 149 (1967)
(suggesting that California's bifurcation procedure has been defeated by altering the
rules to admit evidence of insanity at the first trial).
85. People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338, 343 (Colo. 1981) (limiting affirmative defense
of impaired mental condition to specific intent crimes did not infringe on defendant's
due process rights).
86. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-8-104, 16-8-105 (1986). See Comment, supra note i, at
334. Colorado's procedure presents another problem, however, in that a defendant may
be found insane and committed to a state institution without ever having an opportunity
to prove his or her innocence of the crime charged. See id.
87. For example, in State v. Hebard, 50 Wis. 2d 408, 184 N.W.2d 156 (1971), the
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The intent element of a crime is altogether distinguishable from the
issue of sanity under this line of thought. Thus, a separation of guilt
from criminal responsibility in a bifurcated trial proceeding remains
a viable alternative."8 The restriction of psychiatric evidence to the
insanity phase would follow logically from this approach.
Wisconsin and Minnesota follow this logic by strictly prohibit-
ing the introduction of psychiatric evidence or evidence of mental
condition during the guilt stage of trial. In Steele v. State89 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court barred the introduction of any expert opin-
ion testimony tending to prove or disprove the defendant's capacity
to form criminal intent from the guilt phase of the trial, insisting
that exclusion of such evidence was necessary to preserve the integ-
rity of the bifurcated trial system."0 The Minnesota Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion in State v. Jackman"' in which it held
that psychiatric testimony is inadmissible on the issues of intent and
premeditation.9" Both of these cases draw a critical distinction be-
tween intent as a factual issue and the question of mental capacity
and assert that psychiatric evidence has no probative value on the
issue of intent.
Although Maryland similarly distinguishes intent and criminal
responsibility,"' the Court of Appeals recently concluded in Hoey v.
State" that psychiatric evidence or evidence of an impaired mental
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated. "[Als we see it, a court finding of legal insanity is not a
finding of inability to intend; it is rather a finding that under the applicable standard or
test, the defendant is to be excused from criminal responsibility for his acts." Id. at 420,
184 N.W.2d at 163 (footnote omitted). See also Gallivan, supra note 71, at 521.
88. See Hebard, 50 Wis. 2d at 420, 184 N.W.2d at 163.
89. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
90. Id. at 85, 294 N.W.2d at 7-8. See also State v. Repp, 122 Wis. 2d 246, 257-62, 362
N.W.2d 415, 420-22 (1985) (holding that psychiatric evidence on issue of capacity to
form intent is inadmissible in guilt phase of bifurcated trial).
91. 396 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1986).
92. Id. at 29.
93. In Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979), the Court of Appeals
noted that "the clear legislative intent regarding the successful interposition of a plea of
insanity is not that an accused is to be found not guilty of the criminal act it was proved
he committed, but that he shall not be punished therefor." Id. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584.
The court reaffirmed this in Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983), in
which it observed that "a finding of insanity is not tantamount to an absence of mens rea,
or inconsistent with a general intent to commit a crime." Id. at 269, 465 A.2d at 478.
In addition, along with the bifurcation rule, the Court of Appeals also has adopted
an amendment to Maryland Rule 4-242 which eliminates references to "the defense of
insanity" and substitutes "a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity" to
clarify this distinction. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (amending MD. R. 4-242). See also supra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
94. 311 Md. 473, 536 A.2d 622 (1988).
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state may be admitted to show an absence of mens rea.9 5 In fact, the
text of rule 4-314 dictates only that "evidence of mental disorder or
mental retardation ...shall not be admissible in the guilt stage of
the trial for the purpose of establishing lack of criminal responsibility."96
This language was based on the language of Maine's bifurcation
statute,9 7 which was interpreted in State v. Burnham"8 as allowing the
introduction during the guilt phase of "any evidence, including evi-
dence of mental abnormality, which raises a reasonable doubt as to
whether the defendant had the culpable mental state." 99 Presuma-
bly then, psychiatric evidence should be admissible in the guilt stage
of a trial bifurcated under rule 4-314, not to show insanity or dimin-
ished responsibility but rather to establish a complete absence of
intent.' 00
C. Jury Issues in Bifurcation
The final major question implicated in a bifurcation scheme
concerns the trier of fact. The proposed rule specifies that a jury
first will hear the issue of guilt, and then if the defendant is found
guilty, the same jury will hear the issue of criminal responsibility.'
It also provides for a consolidated voir dire in which prospective ju-
rors will be informed of and examined with respect to the criminal
responsibility issue before the trial on the merits.'1 2
This provision of rule 4-314 is troubling. in that it allows the
jury to decide the guilt question knowing that insanity is at issue,
quite possibly restoring all the prejudice inherent in a unitary
trial.""o. Even though the jury will not hear evidence of insanity dur-
95. Id. at 495 n.5, 536 A.2d at 632 n.5. For a thorough discussion of Hoey, see Survey
of Developments in Mllaryiond Law, 1987-88-Criminal Law, 48 MD. L. REv. 602, 616 (1989).
96. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (codified at MD. R. 4-314(b)(6)(A)) (emphasis added).
97. 16 Md. Reg. 621. Although the reporter's note is not regarded as an official
commentary or interpretation of the proposed Rule, it is helpful at this point in deter-
mining the intent of the Standing Committee. According to the note, the language in
paragraph (b)(6)(A) of Rule 4-314 is based on ME. REV. STAT. ANN. lit. 17-A, §§ 40(2).
(4) (1983 & Supp. 1988). 16 Md. Reg. 621, reporter's note.
98. 406 A.2d 889 (Me. 1979).
99. Id. at 895 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 896 (declaring that "[oInly if the evidence is relevant to a culpable state of
mind and otherwise comports with the rules of evidence must it be admitted..."). Not
all evidence pertaining to the proof of the defense of lack of criminal responsibility will
be relevant to intent and, therefore, admissible during the guilt stage of the trial. Id.
101. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (codified at MD. R. 4-314(b)(2),(5)(A)).
102. Id. (codified at MD. R. 4-314(b)(3)).
103. For example, in United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1972). the
court acknowledged that in some cases
bifurcation alone cannot prevent [prejudice] unless the two parts of the trial are
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ing the first stage, the mere knowledge that an insanity plea has
been raised could impair substantially the credibility of a defense on
the merits.' 0 4 Alternatively, a jury might resolve any doubts as to
the defendant's guilt by finding the defendant not criminally re-
sponsible, thereby assuring indefinite commitment of the defendant
in a state institution.'0 5
The most obvious solution to this dilemma is to require two
different juries, one for the guilt issue and another for the criminal
responsibility issue. In this scheme, thejury passing on the question
of guilt will not know that the defendant's insanity is at issue, and
the jury trying the insanity question will not be aware of the facts
surrounding the guilt issue. Thus, using separate juries completely
abolishes the possibility of prejudice from having one jury hear both
issues. Judicial economy, however, largely has precluded this prac-
tice. Only two states, Colorado and Pennsylvania, currently require
separatejuries in bifurcated trials.'" 6 California's bifurcation statute
permits separate juries in the discretion of the trial court," 7 but
with few exceptions the guilt and insanity hearings are tried before
the same jury.""° Finally, while District of Columbia courts have
recognized the desirability of separate juries if necessary to elimi-
nate prejudice, the trial courts are given broad discretion in decid-
presented to different juries. It would surely be unreasonable to expect ajury
to ignore the lurid details of the crime when turning to the insanity defense
even if the defense on the merits had already been resolved.
Id. at 881. Seealso United States v. Taylor, 510 F.2d 1283, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding
that "the likelihood of prejudice was sufficient to require separate juries" where the
claim of rationality in support of self-defense was inconsistent with the claim of irration-
ality in support of the insanity defense).
104. Bennett, 460 F.2d at 880-81. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
105. Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
106. Colorado's statute specifically commands that "[tihe issues raised by the plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity shall be tried separately to different juries ...... COLO.
REv. STAT. § 16-8-104 (1986). The language in Pennsylvania's statute appears discre-
tionary, providing that "the court, in the interest of justice, may direct that the issue of
criminal responsibility be heard and determined separately from the other issues in the
case and, in a trial by jury, that the issue of criminal responsibility be submitted to a
separate jury." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7404(c) (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1988). Never-
theless, in Commonwealth v. DiValerio, 283 Pa. Super. 315, 423 A.2d 1273 (1981) the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that "[ilf, on the issue of criminal responsibility,
the defendant demands a jury, then that jury may not also determine the other issues.
If, on those other issues, the defendant demands a jury, there must be a separate jury."
Id. at 320, 423 A.2d at 1276.
107. California's statute directs that once a defendant has been found guilty, the in-
sanity question shall be tried "either before the same jury or before a new jury in the
discretion of the court." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989).
108. See Comment, supra note I, at 327 n.4.
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ing whether to impanel a second jury for the insanity phase."0 9
The alternative is to forego informing the jury of the not crimi-
nally responsible plea prior to the guilt stage and to conduct a sepa-
rate voir dire on the insanity issue if the jury returns a verdict of
guilty. The benefit of this procedure is that the jury would render
the verdict on the guilt issue unaware that the defendant has filed an
insanity plea. Maine's bifurcation statute authorizes such a proce-
dure at the election of the defendant," 0 and at least one jurisdiction
has held that to do otherwise would be reversible error."'
Although separate voir dires and separate juries will impose addi-
tional burdens on the court system in terms of time and resources,
Maryland courts should at least be given the discretion to weigh this
burden against the possibility of prejudice on a case-by-case basis
and to conduct separate voir dires or impanel separate juries when
individual circumstances dictate such measures to eliminate
prejudice.
D. Other Provisions of Maryland Rule 4-314
Finally, rule 4-314 contains a miscellany of other provisions
outlining procedural aspects of bifurcation. The rule specifies the
time and manner of moving for bifurcation.' It stipulates that if a
defendant enters a plea of guilty the court will conduct a trial solely
on the issue of criminal responsibility.' Maryland Rule 4-314 also
provides for the selection of alternate jurors and permits the option
of trying the criminal responsibility issue before a judge instead of a
jury."' 4 Furthermore, the new rule states that the State may move
for judgment on the issue of criminal responsibility at the close of
the defendant's case.'' Lastly, Rule 4-314 notes that the order of
109. See Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d 559, 561-62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 858 (1968) (holding defendant is not entitled to two trials as a matter of right);
Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34, 39 (D.C. 1977) (finding that "the court has broad
discretion in considering the impaneling of two juries"); Shanahan v. United States, 354
A.2d 524, 527-28 (D.C. 1976) (stating that in "a request for a new jury at the insanity
phase, appellant must have proffered a 'substantial claim' in the trial court before [it]
can find an abuse of discretion") (footnote omitted).
110. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 40 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
Il1. In Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911 (D.C. 1979), the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals averred that "[b]y injecting the issue of insanity at this stage, the Itrial]
court fatally prejudiced the appellant's defense on the merits because the jury, aware of
a possible insanity defense, 'will tend . . . to believe that [appellant] did the act.' " Id. at
926 (citations omitted).
112. 16 Md. Reg. 1533 (codified at MD. R. 4-314(a)(2)).
113. Id. (codified at MD. R. 4-314(a)(4)).
114. Id. (codified at MD. R. 4-314(b)(4), (5)(B)).
115. Id. (codified at MD. R. 4-314(b)(7)).
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proof and argument in either a bifurcated or unitary trial shall re-
flect the fact that the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue
of criminal responsibility.' 16
III. CONCLUSION
By acknowledging the intrinsic prejudice of coupling an in-
sanity defense with a defense on the merits in a unitary trial, the
Court of Appeals in Treece paved the way for a major change in
Maryland's criminal procedures. Even without the modifications
recommended in this comment, namely authorizing bifurcation only
upon the motion of the defendant and mandating either separate
juries or separate voir dires for the questions of criminal responsibil-
ity and guilt, the bifurcation procedure outlined in proposed Mary-
land Rule 4-314 promises the elimination of at least some of the bias
inherent in a defense of not criminally responsible.
KATHRYN S. BERTHOT
116. Id. (codified at MD. R. 4-314(b)(6)(B), (c)).
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